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Abstract
A large number of IoT devices are connected via the Internet. However, most of
these IoT devices are generally not perfect-by-design even have security weak-
nesses or vulnerabilities. Thus, it is essential to update these IoT devices se-
curely, patching their vulnerabilities and protecting the safety of the involved
users. Existing studies deliver secure and reliable updates based on blockchain
network which serves as the transmission network. However, these approaches
could compromise users privacy when updating the IoT devices.
In this paper, we propose a new blockchain based privacy-preserving software
updates protocol, which delivers secure and reliable updates with an incentive
mechanism, as well protects the privacy of involved users. The vendor delivers
the updates and it makes a commitment by using a smart contract to provide
financial incentive to the transmission nodes who deliver the updates to the IoT
devices. A transmission node gets financial incentive by providing a proof-of-
delivery. The transmission node uses double authentication preventing signature
(DAPS) to carry out the fair exchange to obtain the proof-of-delivery. Specifi-
cally, the transmission node exchanges an attribute-based signature from a IoT
device by using DAPS. Then, it uses the attribute-based signature as a proof-of-
delivery to receive financial incentives. Generally, the IoT device has to execute
complex computation for an attribute-based signature (ABS). It is intolerable
for resource limited devices. We propose a concrete outsourced attribute-based
signature (OABS) scheme to resist the weakness. Then, we prove the security
of the proposed OABS and the protocol as well. Finally, we implement smart
contract in Solidity to demonstrate the validity of the proposed protocol.
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1. Introduction
According to Gartner Inc.[1], the IoT devices are deployed and connected on
the Internet have more than 11 billion in 2018. IoT and its applications have
pervaded in our daily lives from smart home, smart city to smart everything.
However, most of these IoT devices are generally not perfect-by-design with
security weaknesses or vulnerabilities and are easy to be hacked under various
cyber attacks. In September 2018, ZeroDayLab [2] reports a high-severity vul-
nerability in the 4G-based wireless 4GEE Mini modem. The vulnerability could
allow an attacker to run a malicious program on a targeted computer with the
highest level of privileges in the system. Later, Mobile operator EE acknowl-
edged the issue and rolled out a firmware patch to address the vulnerability.
By using a previously disclosed vulnerability revealed in the CIA Vault 7 leaks,
the hackers have compromised more than 210,000 routers from Latvian network
hardware provider Mikrotik across the world, with the number still increasing
[3], [4]. With the continues growth of IoT devices, it is essential to update these
IoT devices securely, patching their vulnerabilities and protecting protecting
the safety of the involved users. Traditional software updates mainly based on
Figure 1: The Client-Server Architecture
the client-server architecture, as shown in Figure 1, create a single point of fail-
ure for denial of service (DoS) attacks. Delivering secure and reliable updates
become a challenge issue for the vendors.
Building upon decentralization concept, the advent of blockchain technology
may provide a solution for IoT [5]. Blockchain is a data structure that is based
on hash functions that builds a linked list by using hash pointers. Each block
stores the transactions in the peer-to-peer network. Some nodes are known as
miners; they run the consensus algorithms such as proof of work (PoW) [6] to
mine and generate a new block. The blockchain employs elliptic curve cryptog-
raphy and SHA-256 hash function to provide security for data authentication
and integrity. As a publicly verifiable ledger, it has a full history of the transac-
tion and provides a global distributed trust. Blockchain technology has widely
applied to healthcare [7], IoT [8], [9], and financial transactions [10] - [12] etc.
There are several blockchain based solutions for IoT software and/or firmware
updates. Several papers [13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21] have studied related
security issues.
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Related Work. Lee and Lee [22] proposed a secure firmware updates
scheme for embedded devices in the IoT environments. They executed firmware
checking and validation by using blockchain with a new block structure and the
BitTorrent as a firmware sharing network for firmware download, to enhance
availability and integrity of updates. Boudguiga et al. [23] used the blockchain
technology to ensure the availability and innocuousness of software updates.
They added the trusted innocuousness nodes checking the integrity of updates
and only the approved updates can be downloaded. Yohan et al. [24] proposed
a firmware update framework by utilizing PUSH-based firmware updates. They
used smart contract and the consensus mechanism of blockchain to preserve the
integrity of updates. Recently, Leiba et al. [25] proposed decentralized incen-
tivized delivery network for IoT software updates. The participating nodes of
delivery network deliver update to IoT devices and the nodes can get the finan-
cial incentive from the vendors. However, these mechanisms are inadequate in
the process of software updates for the privacy of the involved users. In certain
circumstances, when a consumer buys a IoT device, his personal information
could be automatically linked to the device. In the vehicle system, an on-board
unit (OBU) embed into automatic vehicle as a sensing layer node. This node
communicates with the roadside infrastructure and other peer vehicles. The
leakage of user information can lead to privacy threats.
Contributions. In this paper, we propose a new blockchain based privacy-
preserving IoT software updates protocol. It not only protects the privacy of the
updated IoT devices, but also delivers secure and reliable updates with an in-
centive mechanism. The proposed protocol utilizes blockchain, smart contract,
double authentication preventing signature (DAPS) and outsourced attribute-
based signature (OABS) to deliver secure and reliable updates. In this protocol,
the vendor delivers the updates by using smart contract to provide a financial
incentive to the transmission node that provides a proof-of-delivery that a single
update was delivered to the IoT devices. A transmission node obtains proof-of-
delivery by using double authentication preventing signature (DAPS) to carry
out fair exchange. In the process of fair exchange, the transmission node ex-
changes an OABS of the IoT device by using DAPS. Then, it uses the OABS
as s proof-of-delivery to receive the financial incentive. The main contributions
of the proposed protocol are as follows:
We propose a new concrete OABS scheme and prove the existential unforge-
ability under chose message attacks.
We propose the system model and system component of a blockchain-based
privacy-preserving IoT software updates protocol.
We propose a concrete blockchian-based privacy-peserving IoT software up-
dates protocol by integrating blockchian, smart contract, DAPS and our pro-
posed OABS, which satisfies anonymity, proof-of-delivery unforgeability, fair-
ness, authentication and integrity.
We analyze the security requirements of a blockchian-based privacy-preserving
IoT software updates protocol and provide security analysis of the proposed pro-
tocol.
We implement the proposed blockchian-based privacy-preserving IoT soft-
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ware updates protocol using smart contract to demonstrate the validity of the
proposed protocol.
1.1. Organization:
The remain of this paper is organized as follows. The model of blockchain
based privacy-preserving software updates protocol is in Section 2. The intro-
duction of building blocks is given in Section 3. The details of blockchain based
privacy-preserving software updates protocol and the security analysis and eval-
uation are described in Section 4 and Section 5. Finally, we conclude the paper
in Section 6.
2. Blockchain based privacy-preserving software updates model
In the section, we introduce the blockchain based privacy-preserving software
updates model and relevant security requirements.
2.1. Blockchain based privacy-preserving software update model
As shown in Figure 2. there are four participants including vendors, trans-
mission nodes, IoT gateways and IoT devices.
Figure 2: Blockchain-based privacy-preserving software updates model
Vendors: In blockchain network, the vendor as the provider of IoT devices
to publish secure and reliable update. It creates smart contract into blockchain
network to provide financial incentive to the transmission node which delivers
a single update to IoT devices. It acts as miner and verifies all transactions in
the blockchain network. A set of vendors is denoted as V = {v1, v2, · · ·, vn},
where vi ∈ V .
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Transmission nodes: The transmission node acting as broker or serve
provider competitively finds targets and delivers the updates to IoT devices to
obtain financial incentive. It acts as miner to maintain the blockchain network.
The transmission nodes is denoted by T = {t1, t2, · · ·, tn}, where ti ∈ T .
IoT gateways: The IoT gateway acting as routing node such as WiFi router
connects the IoT devices and it transmits the updates to IoT devices. It assists
the IoT device to update and compute. A set of IoT gateways is denoted as
Ggateway = {g1, g2, · · ·, gn}, where gi ∈ Ggateway.
IoT devices: The IoT devices are physical devices such as embedded device
and smartphone. The IoT devices connected to a IoT gateway are denoted as
a set I = {i1, i2, · · ·, in}, where ii ∈ I.
Definition 1. (Blockchain based privacy-preserving software updates model).
It includes a tuple (Setup, KeyGen, Register, Publish, Query, Notification,
Sign1, Sign2, Receive) of polynomial time algorithms, which are defined as
follows:
• (params) ← Setup(κ): This algorithm takes a security parameter κ as
input and it outputs the public parameters params.
• (pk, sk)← KeyGen(params): This algorithm takes params as input and
it outputs a public key pk and a secret key sk.
• (L) ← Register(params, pk): This algorithm takes params and public
key pk as input and it outputs a register list L.
• (Tp)← Publish(params, update, sk): This algorithm takes params, update
and sk as input and it outputs the transaction Tp.
• (1/0)← Query(params, update): This algorithm takes params and update
as input and it outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1}.
• (1/0) ← Notification(Tp, update): This algorithm takes Tp and update
as input and it outputs a bit b′ ∈ {0, 1}.
• (σ1) ← Sign1(params, update, sk): This algorithm takes params, update
and sk as input and it outputs a signature σ1.
• (σ2) ← Sign2(params, σ1, sk): This algorithm takes params, σ1 and sk
as input and it outputs a signature σ2.
• (Tr)← Receive(params, σ2, sk): This algorithm takes params, σ2 and sk
as input and it generates a signature σ3. Then, it outputs a transaction
Tr.
2.2. Security requirements
In the blockchain based privacy-preserving software updates model, it should
satisfy the security requirements as follows.
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Completeness: The completeness says that if the protocol is properly exe-
cuted at all epochs, then an honest transmission node can get financial incentive
and an honest vendor can distribute the updates to its IoT devices.
Anonymity: The protocol protects the privacy of the IoT devices. The IoT
devices execute the protocol for updates without revealing the real identity of
user.
Proof-of-delivery Unforgeability. The transmission node cannot claim
to possession proof-of-delivery that he has not been provided.
Fairness: The fairness is said that, either the transmission node obtains
financial incentive and the vendor distributes the updates to its IoT device or
neither the transmission node and the vendor get nothing, at the end of protocol.
Authentication and Integrity. For a new version update of the vendor,
it should include a valid signature of the vendor to guarantee the authentication
and integrity of updates.
3. Building blocks
In this section, we review the smart contract and the cryptography algo-
rithms used in the protocol.
3.1. Smart contract
Smart contract was firstly proposed by Nick Szabo in 1994 [26]. It is a com-
puterized transaction protocol [27] and it has been applied to Bitcoin network,
Ethereum [28] platform. In Bitcoin network, smart contract evolved from the
scripting language of Bitcoin and it is a based on stack and not turning-complete
language. As the next generation cryptocurrency and decentralized application
, Ethereum [28] supports the smart contract, it offers more expressive expres-
sions with turning-complete languages. Solidity 1, a JavaScript-like languages,
is the most widely adopted language for developing smart contract in Ethereum.
3.2. Double authentication preventing signatures
In 2014, Poettering and Stebila [29], [30] proposed the concept of double
authentication preventing signature (DAPS), which is a factoring-based setting
and prevents compelled certificate creation attack. Later, Ruffing et al. [31]
gave a construction of DAPS in the discrete logarithm setting and it is based
on Merkle trees and chameleon hash functions. The DAPS was used to pe-
nalize the double spending of transactions. We adopt the DAPS to blockchain
based privacy-preserving software updates for fair exchange. We use the prac-
tical instantiation of DAPS scheme in the discrete logarithm setting [32]. Let
ΣDAPS = (DAPS.Setup,DAPS.Kgen,DAPS.Sign,DAPS.V er, DAPS.Ext)
be the DAPS scheme. The DAPS is existential unforgeability under chosen
message attacks (EUF− CMA) secure in the random oracle model [32]. As a
1http://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/latest.
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building block, it can be replaced by other double authentication preventing
signature such as the post-quantum instantiation against quantum computer
attacks and interested readers can refer to [33].
3.3. Outsourced Attribute-based Signatures
The concept of ABS was introduced by Maji et al. [34], [35]. In an ABS, a
signer signs the message based on attributes satisfy the predicate and it doesn’t
revealing the identity of signer. It mainly applies to fine-grained access control
such as anonymous authentication systems. In order to reduce bandwidth and
computational overhead at the signer side, Chen et al. [36] proposed the effi-
cient outsourced ABS (OABS), a signing-cloud service provider (S-CSP) assists
signer to carry out computation. An OABS scheme includes five polynomial
time algorithms: OABS.Setup,OABS.KeyGen,OABS.Signout, OABS.Sign,
OABS.V er.
OABS.Setup: This algorithm takes security parameter κ and the attribute
universe U as inputs. It outputs the public parameter params and the master
key MSK.
OABS.KeyGen: This algorithm takes the public parameter params, the
master key MSK and an access structure (M, ρ) as input and it outputs the
outsourcing key SKM,ρ and the signing key SKOABS .
OABS.Signout : This algorithm takes the outsourcing key SKM,ρ and the
authorized signing attribute set W as input and it outputs the outsourced sig-
nature Γ′.
OABS.Sign: This algorithm takes a message M , the signing key SKOABS
and the outsourced signature Γ′ as input and outputs a signature Γ.
OABS.Ver: This algorithm takes the message M , the signature Γ and the
attribute set W as inputs and it outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1}.
4. Blockchain based privacy-preserving IoT software updates proto-
col
4.1. Overview
The privacy-preserving IoT software updates protocol works as follows. The
vendor as one provider of the IoT devices initializes the system parameters. It
maintains a list of its IoT devices and burns the secret key of device into the
manufactured IoT devices. The transmission node registers with the vendor to
deliver updates to the IoT devices and obtains financial incentive. Then, the
vendor publishes updates by using smart contract and it commits to provide fi-
nancial incentive to the transmission node that provides proof-of-delivery. The
transmission node queries to download the updates that encrypted by the pub-
lic key of the transmission node and it sends notification to the IoT gateways.
Then, the IoT gateway checks the connected IoT devices to match the updates.
The transmission node sends the ciphertext of updates with a DAPS to the IoT
gateways. Then, the IoT gateway verifies the DAPS and sends the ciphertext
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of updates to the IoT devices. The IoT device generates OABS to the transmis-
sion node. When the transmission node receives an OABS, it generates a new
DAPS. As a proof-of-delivery, it sends the DAPS and the OABS to blockchain
network to receive the incentive. The IoT gateway extracts the secret key of
the corresponding public key about the transmission node by using the extract
algorithm of DAPS. It sends the secret key to the IoT device and the IoT device
decrypts the ciphertext of updates. We assume the IoT gateway is honest to
the IoT device and does not collude with the transmission node. In blockchain
network, each entity has the ECDSA key pair (PK,SK), where SignSK(m)
denotes the ECDSA signature on message m.
4.2. The details of protocol
See the Figure 3, the privacy-preserving IoT software update protocol sketch.
Our OABS scheme is based on the ABS scheme of Rao [37]. The concept of the
computational n-Diffie-Hellman exponent problem, access structure and linear
secret sharing scheme can refer to [37],[39]. We adopt ElGamal [38] public key
encryption algorithm to encrypt data (Enc denotes the ElGamal encryption
algorithm and Dec denotes the ElGamal decryption algorithm on data m). The
concrete construction of the protocol is as follows.
• Setup: The vendor runs OABS.Setup, it inputs a security parameter κ and
it outputs the bilinear paring Φ = (q,G,GT , e), where G,GT are cyclic
multiplicative groups with order q. LetM = {0, 1}l be the message space.
The attribute universe U ∈ Z∗q and one default attribute θ ∈ Z∗q . Let n
be a max size of the attribute set. It selects α ∈ Zq, a generator g ∈ G
and sets Z = e(g, g)α. H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l is a collision resistant hash
function. Then, picks V0, V1, · · ·, Vn, u0, u1, · · ·, ul ∈ G. The master key
is MSK = α. Then, it calls DAPS.Setup to generate common reference
string crs.
• KeyGen: The vendor generates an ECDSA key pair (PKv, SKv). Then,
it runs OABS.KeyGen to generate the secret key of the IoT devices for
LSSS access structures (M, ρ). Each row i of the matrix M of size ls × ks
is associated with an attribute ρ(i) ∈ Z∗q . Then, it randomly chooses
α1 ∈ Z∗q such that α2 = α − α1 and computes the sharing {λρ(i) =
Miv : i ∈ [ls]}, where Mi is the ith row of M and the v ∈ Zksq such
that v1 = α1,1 = (1, 0, · · ·, 0) is ks length vector. For each i ∈ [ls],
the vendor chooses ri ∈ Zq and computes di = gλρ(i)V ri0 ,d′i = gri ,d′′i =
{d′′i,x : d′′i,x = (V −ρ(i)
x−1
1 Vx)
ri ,∀x = 2, · · ·, n}. For default attribute θ,
the vendor chooses rθ ∈ Zq and computes dθ = gα2V rθ0 , d′θ = grθ , d′′θ =
{d′′θ,x : d′′θ,x = (V −θ
x−1
1 Vx)
rθ ,∀x = 2, ···, n}. Finally, the vendor returns the
outsourcing key SKM,ρ = 〈{di, d′i, d′′i : i ∈ [ls]}〉, and the private key of IoT
device SKOABS = (SKM,ρ, dθ, d′θ, d
′′
θ ). Then, it burns SKOABS , SKM,ρ
and PKv into the manufactured IoT device. The transmission node calls
DAPS.Kgen to generate its key pair (pkt, skt), as well as generates an
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Figure 3: The sketch of the proposed protocol
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ECDSA key pair (PKt, SKt) and the IoT gateway generates an ECDSA
key pair (PKg, SKg).
• Register: The transmission node registers with the vendor and it sends
pkt to the vendor. Then the vendor maintains a list L which records the
public key pkt of the transmission node. The IoT device sends pkv to the
IoT gateway and the IoT gateway maintains a list L′ which records the
public key pkv.
• Publish: The vendor generates a update denoted as D and sets Did =
H(D). It publishes a smart contract to the blockchain network to provide
financial incentive to the transmission node. As shown in Table 1. the
pseudocode of the smart contract. The vendor sets the limitation time t
as time epoch.
contract ProofOfDelivery
function ProofOfDelivery (v, t, Did, n, W, L, x)
owner ← v
limitationTime ← t
update ← Did
publicKeyList ← L
attributeSet ← W
counterUpdatedDevice ← n-1
incentive ← x
balance ← value
function FinancialIncentive(OABS.Sign, DAPS.Sign, pkt, PKt)
assert current time t1 ≤ limitationTime
if OABS.Ver(attributeSet, OABS.Sign, update)
if DAPS.Ver(pkt, DAPS.Sign)
transfer(balance-incentive∗counterUpdatedDevice, PKt)
counterUpdatedDevice = counterUpdatedDevice - 1
function Withdraw()
assert current time t1 > limitationTime
transfer (balance, owner)
Table 1: The pseudocode of the smart contract
• Query: The transmission node queries the binary files of update Did and
the vendor responses corresponding data. It encrypts the update D with
pkt to generate C = Encpkt(D) and σ = SignSKv (C,Did). Then, it
sends (C, σ) to the transmission node. The transmission node verifies the
signature σ and obtains the update D.
• Notification: The transmission node sends notification of a new update
Did to the IoT gateway. Then the IoT gateway checks connected IoT
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devices and queries the updates by sending a random message m to the
transmission node.
• Sign1: The transmission node calls DAPS.Sign to generate a signature δ1
about (m, pkt). It sends (C, σ, δ1) to the IoT gateway. The IoT gateway
calls DAPS.Ver to verify the signature δ1 and sends (Did, C, σ, pkt) to the
IoT device.
• Sign2: The IoT device verifies the signature σ. Then, it generates OABS
to the transmission node. First, it sends outsouring key SKM,ρ to the
IoT gateway and requests a partial signature. The IoT gateway calls
OABS.Signout with the outsouring key SKM,ρ as follows.
It obtains {wi ∈ Zq : i ∈ [ls]}, where I = {i ∈ [ls] : ρ(i) ∈ W} such
that
∑
i∈I wiMi = 1. Then, computes the coefficients c1, c2, · · · , cn of the
polynomial below.
P (X) =
∏
w∈W∪{θ}
(X − w) =
|W |+2∑
j=1
cj ·Xj−1 =
n∑
j=1
cj ·Xj−1
Set c|W |+3 = · · · = cn = 0. It picks r ∈ Zq and computes
σ′1 = g
r
∏
i∈I
(d′i)
wi , σ′2 = (
∏
i∈I
(di
n∏
x=2
(d′′i,x)
cx)wi) · (V0
∏
k∈[n]
V ckk )
r
Then, it outputs the partial signature Γ′ = (σ′1, σ
′
2,W ) to the IoT device.
After receiving the partial signature Γ′ = (σ′1, σ
′
2,W ), the IoT device uses
SKOABS to run the OABS.Sign algorithm. First, it computes σ1 = σ
′
1 ·d′θ
and (m1, · · · ,ml) = H(pkt||σ1||W ||θ). It chooses s ∈ Zq and computes
σ0 = g
s. Then, the IoT device computes the coefficients c1, c2, · · · , cn of
the polynomial as well as the outsourced signing algorithm. It computes
σ2 = dθ
∏n
x=2(d
′′
θ,x)
cx · σ′2 · (u0
∏l
j=1 u
mj
j )
s. Finally, outputs the signature
Γ = (σ0, σ1, σ2). Then, the IoT devices sends Γ = (σ0, σ1, σ2) to the
transmission node.
• Receive: The transmission node runs OABS.Ver algorithm. It computes
the coefficients c1, c2, · · · , cn of the polynomial as well as the outsourc-
ing signing algorithm and computes (m1, · · · ,ml) = H(pkt||σ1||W ||θ). it
verifies the equation
Z
?
=
e(σ2, g)
e(σ0, u0
∏l
j=1 u
mj
j )e(σ1, V0
∏
k∈[n] V
ck
k )
Then, the transmission node calls DAPS.Sign to generate a new DAPS
δ2. It calls smart contract to output a receive transaction Tr. Once the
transaction Tr is included in blockchain, the IoT gateway uses δ1 and δ2 to
extract the secret key skt corresponding to the public key pkt and sends
skt to the IoT device. Then the IoT device utilizes skt to decrypt the
ciphertext C to obtain the updates D.
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5. Security and implementation
In this section, we analyze the security of the blockchain based privacy-
preserving IoT software update protocol, then report the performance of the
protocol.
5.1. Security analysis
The security of proposed protocol is guaranteed by following lemmas.
Lemma 1. The proposed blockchain based privacy-preserving IoT software
updates protocol satisfies completeness.
Proof. The protocol is properly executed at all epochs. The vendor ini-
tializes system parameters. Then, it publishes smart contract to blockchain
network for a new update. An honest transmission node can obtain financial in-
centive by publishing a proof-of-delivery to blockchain. By the proof-of-delivery
the honest vendor can be sure that an update has been distributed to its IoT
devices and an honest IoT device obtains the updates. In the OABS scheme,
for the attribute ρ(i) ∈W , hence 0 = Pw∈W (ρ(i)) =
∑n
k=1 ck ·ρ(i)k−1. We have
c1 = −
∑n
k=2 ck ·ρ(i)k−1. The default attribute θ is same. Since
∑
i∈I wiMi = 1,
we have
∑
i∈I λρ(i)wi = α1. Now
σ2 = dθ
n∏
x=2
(d′′θ,x)
cx · σ′2 · (u0
l∏
j=1
u
mj
j )
s
= gα2V rθ0
n∏
x=2
(V −θ
x−1
1 Vx)
rθcx · (
∏
i∈I
(di
n∏
x=2
(d′′i,x)
cx)wi) · (V0
∏
x∈[n]
V cxx )
r · (u0
l∏
j=1
u
mj
j )
s
= gα2V rθ0
n∏
x=1
(V cxx )
rθ · (
∏
i∈I
(di
n∏
x=2
(d′′i,x)
cx)wi) · (V0
∏
x∈[n]
V cxx )
r · (u0
l∏
j=1
u
mj
j )
s
= gα2(V0
n∏
x=1
V ckk )
r+rθ · (
∏
i∈I
(gλρ(i)V ri0
n∏
x=2
(V
−ρ(i)x−1
1 Vx)
ricx)wi) · (u0
l∏
j=1
u
mj
j )
s
= gα2(V0
n∏
x=1
V ckk )
r+rθ · g
∑
i∈I λρ(i)wi(V0V
−∑nx=2 cxρ(i)x−1
1
n∏
x=2
V cxx )
∑
i∈I riwi · (u0
l∏
j=1
u
mj
j )
s
= gα2(V0
n∏
x=1
V ckk )
r+rθ · gα1(V0V c11
n∏
x=2
V cxx )
∑
i∈I riwi · (u0
l∏
j=1
u
mj
j )
s
= gα(V0
n∏
x=1
V ckk )
r+rθ · (V0
n∏
x=1
V cxx )
∑
i∈I riwi · (u0
l∏
j=1
u
mj
j )
s
= gα(V0
n∏
x=1
V ckk )
r+rθ+
∑
i∈I riwi(u0
l∏
j=1
u
mj
j )
s
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σ1 = σ
′
1 · d′θ
= gr
∏
i∈I
(d′i)
wigrθ
= gr
∏
i∈I
(gri)wigrθ
= gr+rθ+
∑
i∈I riwi
Therefore,
Z =
e(σ2, g)
e(σ0, u0
∏l
j=1 u
mj
j )e(σ1, V0
∏
k∈[n] V
ck
k )
If δ1 and δ2 are valid DAPS, the IoT gateway can extract the secret key skt
of the corresponding public key pkt by running the DAPS.Ext algorithm. Then,
it sends the secret key skt to IoT device. The IoT device is able to decrypt the
ciphertexts C and gets updates by D = Decskt(C).
Lemma 2. The proposed blockchain based privacy-preserving software up-
date protocol satisfies anonymity.
Proof. In blockchain based privacy-preserving software update protocol,
the anonymity of IoT device is derived from the OABS scheme. Here, we prove
the OABS scheme satisfies signer privacy. For an OABS signature based on the
message pkt with an attribute set W , it outputs the OABS form Γ = (σ0, σ1, σ2),
where
σ0 = g
s, σ1 = σ
′
1 · d′θ = gr+rθ+
∑
i∈I riwi ,
σ2 = dθ
n∏
x=2
(d′′θ,x)
cx ·σ′2·(u0
l∏
j=1
u
mj
j )
s = gα(V0
n∏
x=1
V ckk )
r+rθ+
∑
i∈I riwi(u0
l∏
j=1
u
mj
j )
s,
Let γ = r+rθ+
∑
i∈I riwi, where σ1 = g
γ , σ2 = g
α(V0
∏n
x=1 V
ck
k )
γ(u0
∏l
j=1 u
mj
j )
s.
The (m1, · · · ,ml) = H(pkt||σ1||W ||θ) ∈ {0, 1}l. g is a random generator of G
and V0, V1, · · ·, Vn, u0, u1, · · ·, ul ∈ G are public parameters. The α is master key,
s, γ are random exponents and c1, c2, · · · , cn is the coefficients of the polyno-
mial. Thus, the distribution of OABS (σ0, σ1, σ2) is independent of the signing
key, so the OABS scheme satisfies signer privacy.
Lemma 3. The proposed blockchain based privacy-preserving software up-
date protocol satisfies proof-of-delivery unforgeability.
Proof. In the protocol, the proof-of-delivery unforgeability is derived from
the OABS scheme. We prove the OABS scheme is existential unforgeability
under selective-attribute attack and chosen message attacks secure. The proof
follows from the ABS scheme of Rao et al.[37], we give the description in Ap-
pendix A.
Lemma 4. The proposed blockchain based privacy-preserving software up-
date protocol satisfies fairness.
Proof. First, we consider the vendor and the IoT device are malicious. As
for a vendor, it distributes update to its IoT device without payment and the
IoT device obtains the data of update without providing the OABS. Follow the
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protocol, the vendor encrypts the update D with pkt to generate C = Encpkt(D)
and σ = SignSKv (C,Did). Then, it sends (C, σ) to the transmission node. The
transmission node delivers the ciphertext C to the IoT device. Without the
OABS of the IoT device, the transmission node never submits its DAPS to
blockchain. So, The IoT device is unable to get the secret key skt to decrypt
the ciphertext. The IoT device must send the OABS to the transmission node,
it will get the secret key skt. The transmission node sends the DAPS and the
OABS as proof-of-delivery to blockchain and obtains financial incentive from
the vendor. We say that is contradiction that the vendor distributes update to
its IoT device without payment and the IoT device obtains the data of update
without providing the OABS. Thus, the probability of success for malicious the
vendor and the IoT device is negligible.
The other case is that the transmission node is malicious, the vendor and
the IoT device are honest. The transmission node can get payment without
submitting the DAPS. According to the smart contract, the miner can not
verify the transaction Tr without the DAPS, so the transmission node is unable
to get financial incentive. In the limitation time t, the vendor can withdraw
the payment. In this case, a malicious transmission node gets contradiction.
The probability of success for malicious the transmission node is negligible.
Therefore, The proposed blockchain based privacy-preserving software update
protocol achieves fairness.
Lemma 5. The proposed blockchain based privacy-preserving software up-
date protocol satisfies authentication and integrity.
Proof. For a new update of the vendor, it includes a valid ECDSA signature
of the vendor σ = SignSKv (C,Did) with Did = H(D). The secure ECDSA
signature guarantees the authentication and integrity of the update.
5.2. Performance evaluation.
In the section, we implement our protocol to evaluate its performance. We
refer to Solidity smart contract implemented on Ethereum. Since Ethereum
does not provide the application programme interface (API) for OABS and
DPAS, we will quantify the computation cost of cryptographic algorithms and
the gas cost of smart contract separately. We execute cryptographic algorithms
by Miracl library 2, and selects a CP elliptic curve for security level AES-80.
The experiments platform are based on Dell (Windows 7 operation system with
Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-2450M CPU 2.50 GHz and 4.00GB RAM). The average
time cost of cryptographic algorithms with 1000 times is shown in Table 2.
Since the dominated computation of the IoT device is the signature of OABS,
we evaluate the time cost of OABS signature algorithm. When a IoT device
owns 50 attributes, the time cost is almost 155ms. In the protocol, the total
time cost for a IoT device is 168ms including OABS.Sign, ECDSA.Sign and
Elgamal.Dec algorithm. This is an acceptable result for resource limited device.
2https://certivox.org/display/EXT/MIRACL
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Scheme Setup KGen Sign/Enc Ver/Dec Ext
DAPS 0.007s 0.013s 0.015s 0.031s 0.061s
ECDSA 0.006s 0.002s 0.004s 0.010s -
ElGamal 0.006s 0.002s 0.011s 0.003s -
Table 2: The time cost of cryptographic algorithms on the laptop
Function Transaction Gas Execute Gas Gas cost(ether)
ProofOfDelivery 445140 319096 0.01528472
FinancialIncentive 22657 1009 0.00047332
Withdraw 23027 1755 0.00049564
Table 3: Gas cost of the smart contract
We implement smart contract in Solidity with the Web3j and deploy smart
contract to run different functions of the blockchain based privacy-preserving
software updates protocol. The implementation of smart contract needs a few
ether and the estimates of gas cost is provided in Table 3.
6. Conclusion
We describe a new blockchain based privacy-preserving IoT software update
with proof-of-delivery protocol which utilizes blockchain, smart contract, dou-
ble authentication preventing signature (DAPS) and outsourced attribute-based
signature (OABS) to deliver secure and reliable update. It protects the privacy
of IoT devices, as well as delivers secure and reliable update with an incentive
mechanism. In this protocol, the vendor can deliver update to its IoT device
by using smart contract. The transmission node can obtain financial incentive
by providing a proof-of-delivery. We implemented smart contract in Solidity to
demonstrate the validity of the proposed blockchain based privacy-preserving
software update protocol.
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Appendix A. Unforgeability
Theorem 1. (Unforgeability) Assume n−CDHE problem is (T, ) hard in
G. Then, Our OABS scheme is (T ′, qok, qk, qs, ′)-EUF-sAtt-CMA secure.
Proof. Suppose that an adversary A can break (T ′, qok, qk, qs, ′)-EUF-sAtt-
CMA security of our scheme, there will exist a simulator S that can solve the
n− CDHE problem with a non-negligible probability  by using A’s forgery.
The simulator S is given the hard problem instantiation, the parameters
(q,G,GT , e) and
−→y = (g, gα, gα2 ,· · · , gαn , gαn+2 · · · , gα2n), where α ∈ Zq and
g ∈ G is a generator of G. Let gi = gαi and denote Λ = (α, α2, · · · , αn).
Init. The simulator S specifies one default attribute θ and the attribute
universe U ∈ Z∗q , where |U | = n, n is a bound on the size of attribute set. Then,
the adversary A sends the challenge attribute set W ∗ (|W ∗ < n|) to S.
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Setup. The simulator S selects a collision resistant hash function H :
{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l and picks α′, α2 ∈ Zp. S sets α = α1 + α2 = (αn+1 + α′) + α2
implicitly and sets Z = e(g1, gn) · e(g, g)α′ · e(g, g)α2 . It picks γi ∈ Zq and
sets Vi = g
γigi for each i ∈ [ls]. Then, it computes the coefficients c∗ =
(c∗1, c
∗
2, · · · , c∗n) of the polynomial below.
PW∗(X) =
∏
w∈W∗∪{θ}
(X − w) =
n∑
j=1
c∗j ·Xj−1
S selects γ0 ∈ Zq and sets V0 = gγ0g−c
∗
1
1 · · · g−c
∗
n
n = gγ0−Λc
∗
. Then, S pre-
pares u0, u1, · · ·, ul. It picks a integer β such that {0 ≤ β ≤ l}. It selects
µ0, µ1, · · · , µl ∈ Zq, and δ0, δ1, · · · , δl ∈ {0, · · · , τ − 1}, where τ = 2q(q is the
number of signing queries). Then, it defines ui = g
δi
n · gµi for each i ∈ [l] and
u0 = g
−β·τ+δ0
n g
µ0 . Then, it defines two function F (m) and J(m) for m =
(m1, · · · ,ml), where F (m) = δ0 +Σi∈[l]miδi−β ·τ and J(m) = µ0 +Σi∈[l]miµi.
Finally, S sends the public parameters params = (Φ, U, n, g, Z, V0, V1, ···, Vn, u0, u1, ··
·, ul) to A.
KeyGen Query. The adversaryAmakes outsourcing key query and signing
key query as follows.
-Outsourcing key query. Upon receiving an outsourcing key request,
the simulator S performs simulation as follows. S constructs the outsourcing
key SKM,ρ for the LSSS access struture (M, ρ) with the W ∗ does not satisfy
(M, ρ). Each row i of the matrix M of size ls × ks denoted Mi is associated
with an attribute ρ(i) ∈ Z∗q . Since W ∗ does not satisfy (M, ρ), there is a
vector v1 ∈ Zq for v11 = −1 and Miv1 = 0 for {ρ(i) ∈ W ∗ : i ∈ [ls]}, and
1 = (1, 0, · · · , 0) is ks length vector. S selects a vector v2 such that v21 = 0.
Then, it sets v = −α1v1 + v2 = −(αn+1 + α′)v1 + v2 implicitly. Here v1 =
−α1v11 + v21 = −(αn+1 + α′)v11 + v21 = αn+1 + α′ = α1. S to simulate the
outsourcing key as follows. For each i ∈ [ls], it has two cases.
1). If ρ(i) ∈ W ∗, then Miv1 = 0. λρ(i) = Miv = −(αn+1 + α′)Miv1 +
Miv2 = Miv2. S picks ri ∈ Zq and computes di = gλρ(i)V ri0 ,d′i = gri ,d′′i =
{d′′i,x : d′′i,x = (V −ρ(i)
x−1
1 Vx)
ri ,∀x = 2, · · ·, n}.
2). If ρ(i) /∈ W ∗, then P (X) = P (ρ(i)) 6= 0. ∑nj=1 c∗j · ρ(i)j−1 6= 0, So
c∗ρi 6= 0, where ρi = (1, ρ(i), · · ·, ρ(i)n−1). We have λρ(i) = Miv = Mi(v2 −
α′v1) − an+1Miv1. S picks r′i ∈ Zq and it sets ri = r′i − Miv1c∗ρi ∆ρi implicitly,
where ∆ = (αn, · · ·, a). Then, it computes di = gλρ(i)V ri0 , d′i = gri , d′′i = {d′′i,x :
d′′i,x = (V
−ρ(i)x−1
1 Vx)
ri ,∀x = 2, · · ·, n}. The simulator S returns the outsourcing
key SKM,ρ = 〈{di, d′i, d′′i : i ∈ [ls]}〉 to the adversary A.
-Sign key query. Upon receiving a signing key request, S performs simula-
tion as follows. S chooses an attribute θ and rθ ∈ Zq. Then it uses α2 to com-
pute dθ = g
α2V rθ0 , d
′
θ = g
rθ , d′′θ = {d′′θ,x : d′′θ,x = (V −θ
x−1
1 Vx)
rθ ,∀x = 2, · · ·, n}.
Then, the simulator S returns the signing key SKOABS = (dθ, d′θ, d′′θ ) to the
adversary A.
19
Sign query. A makes signing query on a message M with an attribute
set W . S constructs a LSSS access struture (M, ρ) such that the W satisfies
(M, ρ). Then, it checks whether W ∗ satisfy the LSSS access struture (M, ρ). If
not, S generates the outsourcing key SKM,ρ and the signing key SKOABS for
keygen query phase. Then, It returns the signature Γ = (σ0, σ1, σ2) to A. If W ∗
satisfies the LSSS access struture (M, ρ). S randomly chooses δ′ ∈ Zq, and sets
σ1 = g
δ′ . Then, it computes m = (m1, · · · ,ml) = H(M ||σ1||W ||θ) ∈ {0, 1}l.
If F (m) = 0 mod q, then the simulation aborts. Otherwise, S computes the
coefficients c = (c1, c2, · · · , cn) by the polynomial PW (X) =
∏
w∈W∪{θ}(X −
w) =
∑n
j=1 cj · Xj−1. S randomly chooses s′ to generate σ0 = gs
′
g
−1/F (m)
1 ,
σ2 = g
α′+α2(V0
∏n
x=1 V
ck
k )
δ′ (u0
∏l
j=1 u
mj
j )
s′g
−J(m)/F (m)
1 . Then, S returns the
signature Γ = (σ0, σ1, σ2) to A.
Forgery. The adversary A outputs a forgery Γ∗ = (σ∗0 , σ∗1 , σ∗2) on message
M∗ with the attribute set W ∗. S checks whether Γ∗ is valid and (M∗,W ∗)
have never been queried. If it not, S aborts. If it holds, which means that
σ∗0 = g
s, σ∗1 = g
δ′ , σ∗2 = g
αn+1+α′+α2(V0
∏n
x=1 V
ck
k )
δ′(u0
∏l
j=1 u
m∗j
j )
s. Let γ =
(γ1, · · ·, γn), and u0
∏l
j=1 u
m∗j
j = g
F (m)
n gJ(m) and V0
∏n
x=1 V
ck
k = g
γ0+γc
∗
. Then,
it computes m∗ = (m∗1, · · · ,m∗l ) = H(M∗||σ∗1 ||W ∗||θ) ∈ {0, 1}l. If F (m∗) 6=
0 mod q, then the simulation aborts. If F (m∗) = 0 mod q, the simulator S
computes
σ∗2
gα′gα2 (σ∗0 )J(m
∗)(σ∗1 )
γ0+γc
∗ =
gα
n+1+α′+α2 (V0
∏n
x=1 V
ck
k )
δ′ (u0
∏l
j=1 u
m∗j
j )
s
gα′gα2 (gs)J(m∗)(gδ′ )γ0+γc∗
= gα
n+1
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